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Recent Trends in Monetary 
Policy Implementation: 
A View from the Desk
he environment in which monetary policy is implemented 
has changed significantly over the years, reflecting an 
evolution both in the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures 
and in the behavior of the financial institutions with which it 
transacts. To provide a backdrop for understanding these 
changes, I will begin by reviewing the principles guiding the 
Trading Desk’s day-to-day management of the federal funds 
rate. I will also highlight recent trends in banks’ holdings of 
reserves and clearing balances, as well as discuss the recent 
behavior of the funds rate and its volatility. Finally, I will offer 
some brief observations on factors that could influence the 
Desk’s operating procedures in the future.
Managing the Fed Funds Rate
The basic objective of the Trading Desk is straightforward: to 
manage the federal funds rate in such a way that it trades at the 
Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) target rate. 
Naturally, this means that the Desk wants the funds rate to 
trade as closely to the target as possible, as much of the time as 
possible. But in pursuing this objective, the Desk must take care 
to ensure that an action on one day does not jeopardize the 
attainment of the target on subsequent days, and this often 
limits how aggressively open market operations can be used to 
pursue this rate objective on any single day.
The reason the Desk must consider carefully the size of its 
open market operations lies with banks’ increasingly active 
management of their reserve accounts—that is, the steps they 
take to minimize their reserve levels while avoiding a negative 
end-of-day balance. As a result, banks will try to avoid holding 
quantities of reserves that will lock them into holding excess 
reserves for the entire maintenance period. Thus, when the 
funds rate is above its target, for example, the Desk would 
normally want to add reserves to bring it in line with the target. 
But the overly aggressive addition of reserves in such 
circumstances could drive down the funds rate in subsequent 
days, as banks may be forced to manage to near-zero levels of 
balances on those days in order to minimize holdings of excess 
reserves for the period. In this case, the Desk may want to limit 
the degree of overshooting in order to avoid subsequent 
potential for increases in funds rate volatility.
Another important aspect of the Desk’s management of the 
funds rate is its focus on the rate’s daily performance, rather 
than on the average over the maintenance period. Suppose, for 
example, that the rate was above its target on the first five days 
of the maintenance period. The Desk would not be comfortable 
with, nor would it deliberately engineer, a below-target rate on 
subsequent days so that the period’s average rate would be 
closer to target. Instead, the Desk aims to have the rate trade as 
closely as possible to the target every day, and past deviations of 
the effective rate from the target rate are not deliberately 
reversed.
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Managing intraday rate volatility is another important issue. 
If the funds rate trades above its target in the morning, would 
the Desk add an amount of reserves that would cause the rate 
to fall to near zero at the end of the day, even if such an action 
was necessary for the average rate on the day to be closer to the 
target? Or if the rate is below target in the morning, would the 
Desk be willing to leave institutions so short that the rate would 
likely spike at the end of the day, as institutions that closely 
manage reserves seek to avoid negative account balances? There 
is no quantitative rule for how reserves are managed to address 
these situations. Qualitatively, though, the same principle 
applies: the Desk supplies reserves in such a way that the rate is 
most likely to return to, and to continue to, trade near the 
target as soon as possible, therefore also taking into account the 
likely effect of Desk actions on subsequent days’ trading.
Another issue is the use of open market operations to 
implement changes in the FOMC’s target for the funds rate. 
The conventional, textbook view is that the Trading Desk 
buys and sells securities in response to policy easings and 
tightenings. From the Desk’s perspective, however, the supply-
demand balance is primarily a function of the demand for 
required balances, which is almost completely insensitive to 
small changes in policy. Consequently, any change in the 
Committee’s target has virtually no effect on excess supply or 
demand in the funds market. If the rate does not move quickly 
to the new target, the Desk might supply more or fewer reserves 
on a particular day in order to make it move. However, the 
Desk’s average supply-demand imbalance over a maintenance 
period would be the same as it was before. So if the Desk reacts 
on a particular day by supplying more or fewer reserves than it 
otherwise would have (if the rate had been trading at the 
target), the chances are that actions on subsequent days will be 
just that much smaller or larger.
Factors Affecting Volatility 
in the Funds Rate
Despite the Desk’s best efforts to keep the funds rate close to its 
target and minimize trading volatility, certain factors can at 
times bias the measured effective funds rate. For example, 
when one thinks of the fed funds rate, one thinks of rates bid 
and offered by top-tier institutions. But when the Desk 
calculates the effective rate, it uses all the rates reported by the 
brokers it samples, which may include trades by institutions 
that are not in the top-tier category. Although tiering is not 
currently a major issue, it could at times lead to an upward bias 
in the rate relative to the target. It is also worth noting that the 
daily (volume-weighted) average effective funds rate computed 
by the Fed includes brokered trades by a large portion of federal 
funds brokers; market participants estimate that these trades 
represent only half of all federal funds trades.
Heightened institutional uncertainty over end-of-day 
positions can also bias the funds rate upward. In fact, banks’ 
demand for balances increasingly is a function of the need to 
settle wholesale transactions and to manage uncertainty about 
the day’s final balances. On days when especially high volumes 
of trades are settling (such as settlement dates for new Treasury 
issues, Social Security payment dates, corporate and individual 
tax payment dates, and the first and last days of the month), 
banks tend to be very cautious; during such periods, they 
generally are more uncertain about their end-of-day positions 
and do not want to end the day with negative balances. This 
uncertainty tends to add a premium to the funds rate through-
out the day—at least until very late in the day, when the 
uncertainty subsides. 
Downward bias in the funds rate can be associated with 
certain days as well, particularly business days followed by 
nonbusiness days. Reserves held in a bank’s Fed account on a 
business day continue to be held on the following nonbusiness 
day and count toward meeting reserve requirements. Funds 
held on a Friday, for example, count three times (or even four 
times, if the following Monday is a holiday). Because banks that 
trade in the brokered market typically manage their Fed 
accounts closely to minimize non-interest-bearing excess 
reserves, they tend to be very careful about the amount of 
reserves held on a Friday. This behavior often manifests itself in 
downward pressure on the funds rate on Fridays, compared 
with the rate at which funds would be expected to trade if all 
factors were the same but it was not a Friday. 
In addition, certain pricing patterns in the federal funds 
market limit the Desk’s ability to fine-tune the funds rate. One 
of these is the way in which market participants’ expectations 
of pricing patterns can sometimes become self-fulfilling. 
Specifically, spreads to the target on particular days are often 
incorporated into expectations for similar days in the future. 
For example, if funds were very firm on a quarter-end date, 
there would be a tendency for the same pattern to appear in 
funds trading on subsequent quarter-end dates. The Desk 
tries to work against this psychology by taking into account 
the impact of its actions not only on one day, but also on 
subsequent ones through this expectations channel. However, 
if the Desk reacts too strongly to intraday pressure, it may 
create volatility toward the end of the day and possibly on 
subsequent days as well. These considerations may at times 
limit the Desk’s attempts to influence market psychology.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2002 75
Chart 1
Total Reserve Requirements: Applied Vault Cash















Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Chart 2
Total Fed Balances: Required Clearing Balances,
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Trends in Reserves and 
Clearing Balances 
One of the most significant developments affecting the reserves 
market in recent years has been the secular downward trend in 
the level of reserves (Chart 1).  As one can see from the chart, 
the difference between the level of required reserves and the 
vault cash applied to satisfy reserve requirements represents the 
required reserve balances held at the Fed. 
The main factor behind the post-1995 decline in required 
reserves has been the adoption of sweep programs, in which 
banks shift depositors’ funds between reservable and 
nonreservable accounts in order to reduce reserve 
requirements. The decline in reserve requirements has not 
been matched by a fall in applied vault cash used to meet the 
requirements. This reduction in requirements that must 
be met with Fed balances comes at a cost: banks with lower 
requirements have less flexibility (and face greater end-of-day 
uncertainty) when managing flows into and out of their 
accounts.
Another important trend has been the increased popularity 
of clearing balance requirements. Balances held to meet these 
requirements earn credits that can be used to pay for Federal 
Reserve services. Chart 2 decomposes total balances into the 
portions held to meet reserve requirements and clearing 
balance requirements and the portion held as excess reserves. 
The chart reveals that clearing balance requirements have been 
creeping up since the mid-1990s. A reason for this is that banks 
are realizing that, with lower reserve requirements, having a 
higher level of clearing balance requirements helps them to 
maintain flexibility in managing their Fed accounts. However, 
the desired level of clearing balance requirements is limited by 
the usefulness to an institution of the Fed credits earned. 
(Many institutions do not incur enough service charges for 
these additional credits to be useful, or find their desired 
clearing balance requirement limited by the amount of Fed 
services they use.) Excess reserves have remained very low over 
the same period because banks have been able to manage just 
as effectively with lower total (reserve plus clearing balance) 
requirements.
The Performance of the Funds Rate
Many of the changes in the reserves market, such as the decline 
in reserve balances and the decreasing sensitivity of reserve 
demand to interest rates, might have been expected to increase 
funds rate volatility. In practice, precisely the opposite has 
occurred: deviations between the funds rate and its target have 
generally been smaller since 1999.
These trends in funds rate volatility can be depicted as a 
scatterplot with deviations of the effective rate from the target 
on the x-axis and the daily standard deviations of the funds 
rate, representing intraday volatility, on the y-axis (Chart 3). 76 Recent Trends in Monetary Policy Implementation
Chart 3
Deviations of the Daily Effective Federal Funds 
Rate from Target, and the Daily Standard 
Deviations of the Funds Rate
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: High payment flow days and maintenance period settlement days 
are represented by squares; all other days are represented by circles.
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The top panel of the chart presents the October 1997 to March 
1998 period, distinguishing between “regular” days (circles) 
and “special” days (squares), such as the last day of a settlement 
period or days with high payment flows. As noted, these 
“special” days are associated with larger deviations from the 
target (especially positive deviations) and greater intraday 
volatility.
The bottom panel of the chart depicts the October 2000 to 
March 2001 period. The cloud of points there is clearly lower 
and less dispersed than in the top panel, indicating that funds 
rate volatility is generally lower in the later period for both 
“regular” and “special” days. Deviations between the effective 
rate and the target are smaller, and intraday volatility tends to 
be lower. The decline in volatility probably has several causes, 
including improved reserve management by banks (aided by 
consolidation in the banking industry and increased 
automation), more fine-tuning of reserves supplied by the 
Desk, and perhaps even a bit of good luck. All of these factors 
have helped to contain the deviation of the effective federal 
funds rate from the target and kept volatility low, even as 
required balances have come down.
Going Forward
With these considerations in mind, it is safe to say that a 
number of factors could influence the Trading Desk’s 
operating procedures and practices in the future. A decline in 
the supply of Treasuries, for example, could affect the Desk’s 
ability to conduct its operations by reducing the liquidity of the 
markets in which it operates. So too would financial innovation 
that would greatly reduce the need for clearing balances by 
banks.
Needless to say, the Federal Reserve will continue to explore 
various ways to address these and other developments that 
could affect the Desk’s ability to achieve its objectives for the 
funds rate, as well as issues that could affect the operation of the 
markets and the behavior of banks.
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